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Abstract. Why did the country that borrowed the most industrialize first?
Earlier research has viewed the explosion of debt in 18th century Britain as
either detrimental, or as neutral for economic growth. In this paper, we argue
instead that Britain’s borrowing boom was beneficial. The massive issuance of
liquidly traded bonds allowed the nobility to switch out of low-return invest-
ments such as agricultural improvements. This switch lowered factor demand
by old sectors and increased profits in new, rising ones such as textiles and
iron. Because external financing contributed little to the Industrial Revolution,
this boost in profits in new industries accelerated structural change, making
Britain more industrial more quickly. The absence of an effective transfer of
financial resources from old to new sectors also helps to explain why the In-
dustrial Revolution led to massive social change – because the rich nobility did
not lend to or invest in the revolutionizing industries, it failed to capture the
high returns to capital in these sectors, leading to relative economic decline.
JEL codes: E22, E25, E62, H56, H60, N13, N23,
Keywords: crowding out, debt crises, Industrial Revolution, Ricardian equivalence, mis-
allocation, financial repression, structural change, productivity
*Ventura: CREi, UPF, and Barcelona GSE. Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, E-08005 Barcelona, jven-
tura@crei.cat. Voth: University of Zurich. Schönberggasse 1, CH-8001 Zurich. voth@econ.uzh.ch.
Ventura acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2011-
23197), the Generalitat de Catalunya (2014SGR-830 AGAUR), the Barcelona GSE Research Net-
work, and the ERC (Advanced Grant FP7-249588-ABEP). Voth acknowledges support from the
ERC (Advanced Grant FP7-230515), the University of Zurich, and the SNF (100018-156197).
1
DEBT INTO GROWTH 2
1. Introduction
Over the course of a century, a country accumulates towering debts, mainly to
finance foreign wars – it is fighting abroad in two years out of three. Could such a
country transition from centuries of stagnation to sustained growth? Surprisingly,
the answer is yes – the Industrial Revolution in Britain occurred under such circum-
stances. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 turned Britain into a credible borrower;
subsequently, borrowing increased massively (North and Weingast 1989). From
1692 to 1815, Britain’s debt rose from 5% to over 200% of GDP (Sussman and
Yafeh 2006; Barro 1987). The funds raised were not used to finance productivity-
enhancing infrastructures, but instead to pay for overseas wars. During this period,
Britain was at war for 76 years – 62% of the time. And yet, frequent wars and high
debt accumulation coincided with a remarkable transformation of the economy. By
the end of the period, Britain’s productive capacity had grown by a factor of eight,
allowing it to sustain a population that was four times larger and twice as rich.
Having moved millions of people from the countryside to urban centers, it had
become the “workshop of the world”.
How could Britain industrialize while accumulating towering debts that financed
mainly foreign wars? Earlier research concluded that debt accumulation in 18th
century Britain was detrimental to industrialization since it reduced the savings
available for private investment: “Government borrowing had another ... effect.
Capital was deflected from private to public uses, and some of the developments
of the industrial revolution were once more brought to a halt” (T.S. Ashton 1948).
Williamson (1984) used a calibrated model of the British economy to show that
this crowding-out effect might have slowed output growth by as much as half of
the potential growth rate. But crowding-out should work through interest rates,
and there is little evidence that they increased.1 Barro (1987) argued that debt
accumulation had a neutral effect on industrialization since it raised total savings
instead of reducing private investment.2 Note that both Williamson and Barro
assume that the British economy possessed well-functioning credit markets.3 The
key question is then how much private savings increased in anticipation of future
taxes required to service the debt. Williamson’s answer is ‘not much’ while Barro’s
view is ‘one-to-one’.
In this paper, we argue instead that Britain’s debt accumulation accelerated
industrialization. We model the Industrial Revolution as the arrival of new, high-
productivity technologies.4 Entrepreneurs invest in these new industries because
1Research on interest rates and the yield on private assets has found few effects of sovereign
borrowing. See Mirowski (1981); Clark (2001); Quinn (2001); Sussman and Yafeh (2004). Only
Heim and Mirowski (1987) found evidence that nominal interest rates were somewhat higher
during the Revolutionary Wars with France, but even then they found that real yields were lower.
2Indeed, historians have noted the highly elastic supply of savings in 18th century Britain (Neal
1995).
3By this, we mean that they assume that no-arbitrage conditions generally held, and that interest
rates on government bonds, for example, are informative of the tightness of private credit.
4This is in the spirit of Hansen and Prescott (2001).
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profit rates are high. Initially, entrepreneurs are relatively poor and own a small
fraction of the economy’s savings. The lion’s share of capital is in the hands of
the nobility. Earls and dukes invest in agriculture and traditional industries where
profit rates are relatively low. Ideally, entrepreneurs would borrow massively from
nobles; this would lead to faster growth and a more rapid structural transformation.
Financial frictions make his impossible: the banking sector is small and relatively
inefficient, and the stock market is hamstrung by government restrictions. Prejudice
also plays a role, as the nobility shied away from money-making activities. As a
result, entrepreneurs are forced to finance their investments out of reinvested profits;
capital formation and industrialization are relatively slow.
In such a setting, sovereign debt accelerates structural change. Sovereign bonds
are attractive to the nobility because they offer higher returns than investments in
agriculture and traditional industries. Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are not
tempted to buy sovereign bonds because returns in the new industries are even
higher. Therefore, sovereign debt reduces investments in agriculture and tradi-
tional industries. Reduced labor demand in traditional sectors in turn depresses
wages economy-wide, raising profit rates for entrepreneurs. Since reinvested prof-
its provide most of their financing, this raises investment in new industries. In
combination, this will ensure that sovereign debt accelerates structural change and
growth. In contrast to Williamson and Barro, we emphasize the role of frictions in
private credit markets – before the 19th century, little external financing found its
way into new industries, despite huge profit opportunities. As we describe in sec-
tion II, throughout the Industrial Revolution private credit was limited, expensive,
and it provided almost no resources to the most dynamic sectors of the economy.
Our model highlights two features whose importance has become more apparent
in recent years – the key role of resource reallocation and of credit market frictions
in development (Hsieh and Klenow 2009, Banerjee and Moll 2010 and Gancia and
Zilibotti 2009). The effects of credit market frictions is surveyed in Banerjee and
Duflo (2005) and highlighted in recent research by, inter alia, Banerjee and Duflo
(2014) and Banerjee and Munshi (2005) . Our emphasis on credit market frictions
in a context of uneven growth in different sectors is related to Song, Storesletten,
and Zilibotti’s (2011) recent work on China. By emphasizing resource reallocation
and credit market frictions, our model offers a unified explanation for key macroe-
conomic aspects of the Industrial Revolution.
The first aspect is relatively slow growth at the start of the Industrial Revolution.
One of the key insights from the last 30 years of research on the British economy
after 1700 is that growth was relatively slow before 1850, with output per capita
rising at a rate of 1% p.a. or less (Crafts and Harley 1992; Antras and Voth 2003).
As in the seminal work by Crafts (1985), structural change is the key characteristic
of the industrialization process in our approach – the shift out of agriculture and
into industry. Our model offers one interpretation of why growth was not faster:
DEBT INTO GROWTH 4
slow capital formation slowed down structural change because it was limited by the
self-financing ability of entrepreneurs.
A second aspect of the Industrial Revolution that our framework sheds light on is
the social change engendered by the Industrial Revolution. Britain’s nobility in 1700
held the vast majority of wealth and political power; by 1900, its relative position
had declined markedly. The nobility did not invest directly in new technologies; it
also did not lend to capitalists, either directly or through the financial system. Had
the nobility been able to finance the new class of entrepreneurs in a competitive
well-functioning credit market, it would have appropriated virtually all of the profit
opportunities arising from the new technologies – and the Industrial Revolution
would have generated little or no social change.5
A third aspect of the Industrial Revolution is limited gains in terms of living
standards accruing to the working class. Real wages did not keep up with output
growth during the core phase of the industrialization process (1770-1830); the wage
share of national income fell sharply, while the share going to capital surged (Allen
2009). Our model offers an explanation for this puzzling feature, by showing how
massive sovereign borrowing contributed to the divergence between productivity
and wages. It is precisely the reduction of labor demand (because nobles switched
from low-return investments to sovereign debt) that kept wages low and generated
the entrepreneurial profits needed to finance industrialization.
We deliberately abstract from other aspects of the Industrial Revolution. First,
we take technological change as given. While the aggregate productivity statistics
do not show it, the eighteenth century saw many important inventions and inno-
vations, from the use of steam power to advances in cotton spinning, weaving, and
transport (Mokyr 1990). Nor do we seek to explain why these advances were first
conceived or implemented in Britain (Allen 2009). Furthermore, we do not examine
the role of new sources of energy (Wrigley 1990, Stokey 2001), nor of foreign trade
(Crafts 1985, Crafts and Harley 2000, Temin 1997) or of improvements in transport
(O´Rourke and Williamson 2005, Bogart 2009). Finally, we do not consider the
impact of institutional improvements (North and Weingast 1989, Mokyr and Nye
2007). All these factors undoubtedly contributed to the Industrial Revolution in
ways small or large. Here, we focus on the factors that determined how quickly
technological change made itself felt in the economy at large.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the historical
background and context. It reviews the stylized facts of the Industrial Revolution
and it also describes the main features of the British financial system. Section III
presents our model and derives our analytical results. It also provides a very rough
attempt at quantification. Section IV concludes.
5This depends on the relative bargaining powers of savers and investors in new technology. How-
ever, since the nobility was small, it is likely that it would have exerted substantial market power.
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2. Historical Background
In this section, we first briefly summarize key macroeconomic features of the
British Industrial Revolution, as well as of the political context. In addition, we
discuss the social and distributional consequences of the transition to self-sustaining
growth, and we highlight the main features of the UK financial system.
2.1. War and the growth of debt in eighteenth-century England. The so-
called Glorious Revolution in 1688 deposed James II from the throne. Parliament
invited William of Orange to become monarch. The new constitutional settlement
included major restrictions of the monarch’s powers, and a much-expanded role for
Parliament. Taxation required the parliamentary assent; the judicial powers of the
king were severely curtailed (North and Weingast 1989).
At the time of the Glorious Revolution, Britain had only a small national debt.
In the next 150 years, the total debt stock rose rapidly. Between 1692 and 1815,
debt rose from 5% of GDP to more than 200% (Barro 1987). The cost of numerous
wars that followed the accession of the Hanoverian kings to the throne was largely
responsible. Britain found itself at war for 81 years, or almost 2 out of every 3. The
expenditure on the armed forces was considerable, and constituted by far the single
most important item of the government budget. A single ship of the line of the
Royal Navy cost more than all the capital in the most expensive iron-works built
at the time (Brewer 1990). In the period 1692-1815, spending on the Army, Navy
and on ordinance was equivalent to 72% of total revenue. Once the debt service
costs were added to this figure – due to the debts accumulated in wartime – there
was hardly any money left for non-military spending.
Figure 2.1 shows the path of overall expenditure and of total debt. Shaded areas
indicate wars. Dramatic spikes in total spending almost always coincided with
major wars. Almost the entire rise in debt during the eighteenth century occurred
while Britain was fighting abroad. Once peace was concluded, debt levels typically
stabilized in nominal terms, and GDP growth reduced the debt burden over time.
Peaking at over 200% after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, debt eventually fell to
100% of GDP by the middle of the nineteenth century.
Due to frequent wars, borrowing needs were substantial. In addition, new finan-
cial instruments facilitated the growth in public debt. Prior to the eighteenth cen-
tury, most borrowing by the English Crown was complex and created liquid assets.
So-called tallies – notched wooden sticks denoting various amounts of taxes payable
to the government – were used to borrow. In effect, tally rods acted like short-dated
IOUs issued by the government, backed by a specific tax stream. While these could
be resold, trading was typically highly illiquid, with discounts of more than half of
face value. After numerous experiments, the British government granted privileges
to several companies, in exchange for financing the public debt. The most impor-
tant included the Bank of England, the New East India Company, and the South
Sea Company. All of these received royal charters in exchange for taking on some
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Figure 2.1. Debt and Expenditure in the UK, 1692-1860
of the government’s debts. In addition, government bonds were combined with a
national lottery (Million Adventure). Life annuities were issued, as well as tontines.
Short-term borrowing in case of war by the armed forces produced so-called army
and navy bills, effectively short-dated promises to pay. The biggest experiment of
all involved the South Sea Company, which offered to exchange all public debt in
1720 for shares. A similar exercise in 1719 had been attractive to both the gov-
ernment and the public, by improving the liquidity of outstanding debt. While the
South Sea scheme ultimately failed, it demonstrated the attractions of liquid paper
assets. The UK finally introduced consolidated annuities (“consols”), perpetual
bonds with a relatively low interest rate (Dickson 1967). These were first issued in
1751. Originally carrying a yield of 3.5%, they were eventually converted to 3% in
1757 (and to 2.75% in 1888). Consols were liquidly traded, and became a prime
savings vehicle for the moneyed classes in the UK.
2.2. Britain’s growth and industrial transformation. Growth during the
classic period of the British Industrial Revolution (1760-1850) was slow by modern
standards. Initially, output growth per capita was barely faster than during the
pre-industrial period.6 After the middle of the 18th century, growth accelerated
from around 1 % p.a. to 2.5%. At the same time, population increased rapidly,
from 5.2 million to 19 million. Growth rates across sectors were highly unequal.
Figure 2.2 shows annual GDP by sector. Agriculture expanded relatively slowly
over the period 1700-1860, increasing total output by a factor of 2.8 – a slower rate
of increase than that of population.7 Over the same period, real GDP in services
increased 9-fold, and in industry, 14-fold (Broadberry et al. 2010) .
6Galor (2005) gives a figure of 0.1% p.a. for the pre-industrial era, while the work of Crafts and
Harley suggests rates of 0.2% p.a. in the years 1760-1800.
7For the effects of population pressure on economic structure, cf. Crafts and Harley (1992).
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Figure 2.2. Growth of Output in Britain, 1700-1860
TFP growth remained below 1% p.a. until the 1830s, if not longer. After
1760, investment as a percentage of GDP probably increased from around 8% to
over 12%. Capital input in the economy grew slightly more rapidly than labor
input, creating a small rise in capital intensity. Land in use also increased as more
marginal areas were brought under the plough. Aggregate TFP growth was not high
by the standards of later periods, but faster than before 1760. These findings are
confirmed by studies using the productivity dual – factor returns did not increase
rapidly overall.8 Table 1 summarizes the key facts:
Table 1. Estimates of Productivity Growth in England, 1770-1860
change in % p.a.
r w q TFP
Antràs and Voth (2001)
1770-1801 -0.28 0.40 0.13 0.12
1801-1831 0.83 0.34 0.20 0.49
1831-1860 0.74 0.56 0.11 0.56
Y K L T TFP
Harley (1999)
1760-1800 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.2 0.19
1801-1831 1.9 1.7 1.4 0.4 0.50
1831-1860∗ 2.5 2.0 1.4 0.6 1.00
Sources: Antràs and Voth (2001), Harley (1999, p. 183).
Notes: r – rental rate of capital, w – real wage, q – rental cost of land
Y – output growth, K – capital, L – labour, T – land
Antràs and Voth (2001) use an elasticity of 0.35 for capital, 0.15 for land, and 0.5 for labour.
8Antras and Voth (2003) .
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Wages increased relatively slowly between 1760 and 1860, by approx. 30% (Fe-
instein 1998). The remuneration of labor thus failed to grow in line with output
per capita.9 The same is true for land rents. Because rents and wages grew less
rapidly than output, the share of capital in total factor payments increased (Table
2). The period 1770-1850 therefore saw a major increase in the capital share of
output (Allen 2009), which rose from 18% to 45% in less than a century. Growth
of the capital stock was only one reason for the rise in the capital share. Crafts
(2005) estimates that capital deepening contributed approximately one third to to-
tal per capita output growth during the Industrial Revolution. The rate of return
on capital in Britain also grew from 10% in 1770 to over 23% by 1860.
Table 2. Factor shares in Britain, 1770-1860
1770 1860 Change 1770-1860
Capital 18% 45% +27%
Labor 60% 47% -13%
Land 22% 8% -14%
The slow rate of output growth is remarkable not least because technological
change was rapid. A “wave of gadgets” (TS Ashton) in the 1770s and 1780s created
the foundations for new products and processes. The frequency of useful patents,
as measured by their subsequent citation frequency, surged. Foreign trade statistics
suggest that technological change was broad-based.10
These changes in factor shares also spelled social change. As income on capital
increased, the relative importance of landed wealth declined. Slowly but steadily,
Britain’s nobility lost its position of paramount importance in the national wealth
and income rankings (Rubinstein 1977).
Rapid structural change was the most outstanding feature of Britain’s industrial
transformation (Crafts 1985). While total population more than doubled, the ab-
solute number of people employed in agriculture remained broadly constant. Thus,
the share of Britons working in agriculture fell from 57 to 25 percent over a 150
year period.11 Compared to the ‘European norm’, Britain experienced an early and
rapid shift from the primary to the secondary sector (Wrigley 1985).
2.3. The rise of new industries. While aggregate growth rates were low, some
individual sectors grew rapidly. Cotton, and to a lesser extent, iron production,
transportation, and machinery expanded rapidly, starting from a low base. Pro-
ductivity in cotton production increased by 2.6% annually, shipping by 2.3%, and
worsteds and canals by 1.3 and 1.8% respectively over the period 1780-1860. This
implies that Britain became 8.8 times as productive in producing cotton goods, for
9More recent work by Clark (2005) suggests slightly faster growth, but still confirms the conclusion
that output growth was markedly faster than wage growth.
10Cf. Temin (1997) . The conclusion has been questioned by Crafts and Harley (2000).
11Crafts (1985).
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Figure 2.3. The growth of modernizing industrial sectors, 1770-
1831 (value added in millions of pounds sterling p.a.)
example. Output in new sectors expanded even more, as more labor and capital
were drawn in. Cotton production increased 42-fold over the period.
As the new sectors grew, their share of the industrial sector increased – and the
economy itself became increasingly industrialized. Figure 2.3 illustrates the growing
importance of “modernizing” sectors. From 13% of industrial output, modernizing
sectors grew to 36% by 1831. In other words, by 1830, more than one third of
industrial output already came from the sectors that benefited the most from the
new inventions of the industrial era, a share that only increased subsequently.
2.4. The UK financial system. While government debt surged after 1680, pri-
vate credit intermediation remained remarkably underdeveloped. As Postan (1935)
observed, “the reservoirs of savings were full enough, but conduits to connect them
with the wheels of industry were few and meagre ... surprisingly little of [Britain’s]
wealth found its way into the new industrial enterprises ...” . In other words, the
new, dynamic sectors of the economy – cotton manufacturing, iron production, coal
mining, ceramics – were initially starved of capital. They largely financed them-
selves through retained profits and informal credit. Peer-to-peer lending dominated
where credit was available at all – entrepreneurs were forced to turn to friends, fam-
ily, and local owners of liquid funds to raise capital (McCraw 1997; Mokyr 1999).12
Private credit markets worked poorly for several reasons. The Bank of England
was largely a conduit for government debt. Goldsmith banks were small and few
12In contrast to France, Britain had no system of public notaries who facilitated such transactions
(Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal 2000). Note that informal lending is still common today,
both in the developing world and in countries with highly developed capital markets (Azam et al.
2001, Townsend 2005).
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in number, and only catered to a moneyed and landed elite. Merchant banks fi-
nanced foreign trade. Almost no financial institutions attempted to provide funds
for entrepreneurs.13 Banks were hamstrung by government regulations. The size
of partnerships in England was limited to six, severely curtailing the size of banks.
Usury laws limited (private) interest rates. This rule made lending on anything
but the best collateral, and to the safest borrowers, unprofitable. Temin and Voth
(2008) document how the usury law led to massive distortions in lending. In ad-
dition, loans could legally not be made for periods greater than six months. This
made it hard for borrowers to use funds for illiquid investments. There was no
central bank, charged with providing liquidity. Existing banks struggled under the
threat of illiquidity, and many floundered because of it.
Nor could new firms easily raise equity on the stock market. As a result of the
South Sea bubble, the government introduced tight restrictions on the founding of
new joint stock companies in the form of the so-called “Bubble Act”. The legislation
required all new joint stock companies to have a royal charter. Effectively, until its
repeal in the 19th century, the Bubble Act closed the door on all forms of capital
raising via the issuance of new equity (Harris 1994). In combination, private credit
intermediation in Britain before the 1820s worked poorly at best. On the whole, it
failed to provide significant funding for new enterprises, which were mostly financed
from retained earnings. Nothing attests more eloquently to the shortcomings of the
UK financial system than the large gap between rates of return on capital invested
in manufacturing on the one hand (Allen 2009 ), and the cost of borrowing on the
other.
2.5. The market for land. Wealth in England was overwhelmingly held in the
form of land. Lindert (1986) estimates that it accounted for 74% of total wealth
in 1740. As late as 1875, this share was close to half. Most land was owned by
the nobility and landed gentry. While land could in general be bought and sold,
the extent of the land market was relatively limited. In the Middle Ages, outright
ownership of land was only possible for the Crown. Gradually, England evolved two
forms of ownership – freehold and leasehold. Freehold property can be transferred
freely and entitles the owner to all rights. Leasehold comes in a bewildering range
of types, from tenancy at will to leases for life and leases with large entry “fines”
and low annual charges. All of these involved the eventual (possible) reversion of
full ownership to the freehold owner.
In addition, many noble estates were structured in the form of perpetual trusts.
This made it impossible for heirs to sell land outright, thus checking the tendency
of some nobles to overspend, borrow on mortgage, and then have to sell the land
to satisfy creditors. Only leases could be agreed for land held in perpetual trusts.
13Brunt (2006) argues that country banks acted like venture capital firms during the British
Industrial Revolution. The cases he shows are suggestive, but it is doubtful that this represents
an important part of business financing at the time. The analogy with venture capital firms is
also strained, since the upside to the bank was severely limited – at no more than 5%.
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This limited the extent to which land could become a widely-traded asset. As a
result, almost no Englishmen other than members of the titled elite could aspire
to freeholds. Nor could commoners freely add to land holdings due to a general
scarcity of property available for outright purchase.
In one sense, however, the market for land in England was efficient. Leaseholders
paid rent charges to the freeholder. These could be renegotiated with varying
frequency. As Clark (2002) demonstrates, rent charges in general moved with the
productivity of land.
2.6. Comparative rates of return. For our argument to hold, comparative rates
of return on assets have to show a particular ordering. Rates of return on investment
in agriculture have to be lower than on government debt; and government debt in
turn has to pay less than equity investments available to capitalists, especially those
in the new industries.
Landlords with money to invest in the land could either acquire more of it (as far
as it was available), or use it in improvements such as drainage, liming and marling,
as well as enclosure. Neither was more profitable than purchases of government
bonds. Figure 2.4 shows the relative valuation of government bonds (consols) and
of land, from 1795 to 1930. The y-axis measures “year’s purchase”, meaning the
multiple of annual payments received by the owner. Until the 1890s, land traded
at a higher multiple than government debt – the interest on the (liquidly traded)
debt was markedly higher than the yield on land, which was not only hard to trade;
administering it was also costly.
The implications were not lost on landowners. A few, large landholders such as
the Duke of Marlborough had very large holdings of government debt as early as
1750 (Dickson 1967). The Earl of Shelburne, at the time of his death in 1751, held
99% of his wealth in government debt. Just one generation earlier, this would have
been unthinkable. Especially newly rich members of the gentry did not commit a
large share of their assets to land anymore:
“Once secure long-term paper assets were available which did not
require active management by the owner there were very good rea-
sons why a new man who wished to establish a landed dynasty
should retain . . . his fortune in such assets. . . as part of the longer-
term endowment of the family. They yielded a much higher net
income than that derived from land purchase.”
The Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, advised that “every landowner ought to have
as much property (as his estate) in consols or other securities. . . ” (Habakkuk 1994).
Nonetheless, in the mid-eighteenth century, most of the landed elite was yet to
move massively into consols and other government debt. Over the next hundred
years, they did so. The period after 1750 saw an important reduction in investments
in land and an increase of investments in government debt. As one large landowner
explained to another in 1847, he was going to sell land and invest in government
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Figure 2.4. Relative valuation of government bonds and land
debt “. . . because I do not think it worth while to keep a security paying 2 per cent,
when I can get an equally good one paying 5.” Lord Monson put it simply: “What
an infernal bore is landed property. No certain income can be reckoned upon. I
hope your future wife will have consols. . . ” (Thompson 1963). Indeed, by the 19th
century, an increasing number of peers was not just curtailing investment in land,
but selling off large parts of their landholdings in a bid to diversify and increase
their income (Habakkuk 1994). Similarly, as Jane Austen’s novels make abundantly
clear, members of the gentry in general held most of their wealth in government
debt by the early 19th century (Copeland 1993).
Land improvements also made poor investments. For example, the Duke of
Northumberland invested nearly £1 million between 1847 and 1878; only at the
end of the period did this enormous expense yield a return of 2.5 percent – at a
time when consols carried a yield of over 3 percent (Thompson 1963). Drainage
only got under way on a large scale in the 19th century. It required help through
government loans to be profitable (Phillips 1989). Enclosure’s profitability is contro-
versial. While authors initially argued that potential profits were high (McCloskey
1972), later work has overwhelmingly concluded that economic gains were minor
and costs tremendously high (Clark 1998; Allen 1999). Clark estimates that en-
closure’s average return after costs was a mere 0.6% during the period 1600-1830;
it was only after the 1750s that it became profitable at all, in some parts of the
country, because of rising agricultural rents. Figure 2.5 compares returns to land
enclosure and on government debt over time. There is no decade when investments
in land yielded a higher return than government bonds.
Importantly, net rent gains on enclosed land varied widely – Clark reports a range
of -1 to 111% for individual estates, for enclosures after 1750. Because average gains
were small and heterogeneity high, it is plausible that on many estates and for long
DEBT INTO GROWTH 13
Figure 2.5. Yield on Government Bonds and Returns to Enclo-
sure, 1692-1860
periods of time, there was little economic gain from investing money in enclosing
the land. In other words, many landlords, faced with a choice between investing
in improving their estates and investing in government bonds must have found the
latter vastly more attractive. In addition to the high average return, they could
hold an asset that yielded the same or more every year, was uncorrelated with the
value of most of their property, and that could be traded liquidly.
Finally, for our argument to be valid, it has to be the case that government bonds
offer returns that are lower than those attainable to investors in manufacturing.
While evidence is sketchy, (Allen 2009 calculates the rate of return on capital
invested in manufacturing, and finds rates in excess of 10%, rising to 25% as the
Industrial Revolution wore on. Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that rates of
return on capital in new industries were even higher.
2.7. Dynamic inefficiency. One simple criterion for dynamic inefficiency is that
the return to capital is lower than the investment rate: rtKt ≤ Itwhere r is the
rate of return, K is the capital stock, and I is investment. In other words, if
a country invests more than the return on capital, it could improve output by
reducing investment – its investment exceeds Phelps’ “Golden Rule” (Abel et al.
1989 ). We argue that this was the case in British agriculture before the surge of
government debt issuance.
Returns to agriculture are composed of three elements – payments for labor used,
for land, and for capital invested in agriculture. Good data before the Industrial
Revolution is largely nonexistent. During the period 1770-1810, the agricultural
capital stock increased by £138 million; over the same period, total income in the
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Figure 2.6. UK debt dynamics, 1700-1913
agricultural sector amounted to £217 million. The capital share in agriculture was
probably around 20% (Crafts and Harley 2000), corresponding to £43 million. In
other words, net investment in agriculture for a good part of the late 18th century
was three times higher than the return to capital.14 This strongly suggests that
dynamic inefficiency in agriculture was a real possibility. This must be all the more
true for the period before 1750, when few assets competed with capital investments
in agriculture.
Interestingly, this pattern reversed in the early 19th century, when the new indus-
tries had reached a substantial size and urbanization was high. Growth accelerated
as the high rates of productivity and output growth in the new sectors applied to
an ever larger base. In parallel, over the period 1820-50, the UK capital in the
agricultural sector probably generated returns of £41 million, while the agricul-
tural capital stock declined, generating a surplus for consumption of £78 million.
In other words, dynamic inefficiency was no longer a feature of the UK agricultural
sector after 1815 – as we would expect if debt issuance was effective in draining the
“swamp” of inefficient investment in agriculture.
An alternative criterion for dynamic inefficiency is that the return on government
debt be lower than the rate of output growth. To show this, we calculate holding-
period returns for bond holders, combining interest received with changes in the
value of bonds. In 43 out of 160 years – 27% of the total – the return to bonds was
actually less than the rate of growth.
Figure 2.6 shows how both the absolute stock of debt and debt/GDP ratio
evolved over time. In the 18th century, debt surged in wartime. In peacetime,
14If we use the alternative, higher capital shares in Stokey (2001) for the economy as a whole, we
still find that investment was greater than capital income.
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its level was essentially flat, or falling slightly at best; but debt/GDP ratios de-
clined rapidly as growth eroded the relative weight of previous borrowing. The
same mechanism was at work after 1815. In 1815, after the end of the Napoleonic
Wars, Britain’s debt amounted to £792 million ; in 1914, to £843 million, some
6% higher. At the same time, the debt/GDP ratio declined to 1/10th of its former
level, from 226% to 25%. Britain’s 18th century borrowings were never repaid;
its massive debts simply dwindled into insignificance as a result of rapid economic
growth.
3. Debt into growth: understanding the mechanism
Here, we present our argument in four steps. First, we present our basic setup
and describe the pre-industrial steady state. Second, we model the Industrial Rev-
olution as a process of structural change and show how the absence of an effective
private credit market allows us to account for some of its key historical features.
Third, we use the model to study the effects of sovereign debt and the channels
through which it affects structural change and economic growth. Fourth, we simu-
late the model to gain insight intor the quantitative importance of the mechanism
that we propose.
3.1. The pre-industrial society. Consider an economy with a single or composite
good that is produced with three factors, land, capital and labor. The production
technology can be represented as follows:
(3.1) F (lt, kt, nt) = lλt · kαt · n1−λ−αt
where lt, kt and nt are land, capital and labor; and λ > 0, α > 0 and λ+α < 1. Land
and labor exist in fixed supply and we normalize their sizes to one, i.e. lt = nt = 1.
Capital depreciates at rate δ. To produce one unit of capital in period t + 1, one
unit of goods must be invested in period t. Factor markets are competitive and
all factors are paid their marginal products. Owners of land and capital earn a
fraction λ and α of the output, respectively; while labor earns the rest.
The pre-industrial economy contains two groups, nobles and masses, plus the
crown. The nobles own the land and the capital stock. They save a fraction β of
their income each period and invest it. The masses own the labor, and they do not
save. The crown fights foreign wars that cost a fraction x of output. We model this
cost as pure waste. In the pre-industrial industrial economy, the crown finances the
cost of war with a proportional tax on production which reduces the income of all
factors by a fraction x.
With this simple set of assumptions, we can trace the dynamics of the capital
stock in the pre-industrial economy:
(3.2) kt+1 = (1− δ) · kt + β · (λ+ α) · (1− x) · kαt
Equation (3.2) describes the dynamics of the pre-industrial economy. These dy-
namics follow the law of motion of the classic Solow model with an investment rate
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equal to β · (λ+ α) · (1− x). From any starting capital stock, the pre-industrial
economy converges monotonically to a steady state with the following capital stock:
(3.3) k∗ =
[
β · (λ+ α) · (1− x)
δ
] 1
1−α
We take the steady state of the pre-industrial economy as the starting point of
our story. From here, we analyze the consequences of two major developments.
The first one is the Industrial Revolution which we interpret as the arrival of a new
class of capitalists that brought many important inventions and innovations that
radically transformed the British economy. The second development is the Glorious
Revolution that converted Britain into a credible borrower and allowed the crown
to finance foreign wars through debt accumulation rather than taxes. We study
each of these developments in turn.
3.2. A stylized model of the Industrial Revolution. Assume now the arrival
of a new class of capitalists with a new industrial technology and an arbitrarily
small initial stock of capital. Like the nobles, capitalists save a fraction β of their
income and invest it. But their technology is pi > 1 times more efficient than that
of the nobles. That is, for each unit of goods they invest, they obtain pi units of
capital while the nobles obtain only only one unit.
A reasonable-looking but untrue story for the Industrial Revolution would go
as follows. The capitalists had great investment opportunities, while the nobles
had plenty of savings. This situation led to the rapid development of a private
credit market where capitalists heavily borrowed from nobles. Competition for
funds equalized the interest rate to the return to the capitalists’ investments. In
terms of our stylized model, the Industrial Revolution transforms the dynamics of
accumulation as follows:
(3.4) kt+1 = (1− δ) · kt + pi · β · (λ+ α) · (1− x) · kαt
(3.5) st+1 =
(1− δ) · kt + pi · β · α · (1− x) · kαt
(1− δ) · kt + pi · β · (λ+ α) · (1− x) · kαt
· st
where st is the share of the capital stock owned by capitalists. Since the capitalists
save the same fraction of their income as the nobles, the aggregate investment
rate is not affected by the Industrial Revolution. But Equation (3.4) shows that
investment efficiency is now higher since each unit of goods invested produces pi
units of capital rather than one. Equation (3.5) shows how the share of the capital
stock owned by the capitalists evolves over time. To understand this Equation,
note that the investment that capitalists finance capitalists finance in period t is
β · α · st · (1− x) · kαt , while total investment is β · (λ+ α) · (1− x) · kαt . From
any starting capital stock, the industrial economy converges to the following steady
state:
(3.6) k∗ =
[
pi · β · (λ+ α) · (1− x)
δ
] 1
1−α
and s∗ = 0
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Figure 3.1. Transition to the industrial steady-state with and
without credit market
The transition from the pre-industrial steady state in Equation (3.3) to the in-
dustrial steady state in Equation (3.6) is shown in Figure 3.1 and 3.2 with dashed
lines. The arrival of the capitalists starts a process of fast economic growth as the
economy converges to a higher steady-state capital stock. This raises the consump-
tion of both nobles and the masses, but not the consumption of the capitalists.
Since competition equalizes the interest rate to the return to investment, the gains
from the new technology are reaped by the nobles that finance it and not by the
capitalists that own it. Indeed, the capitalists not only do not become rich as
a group but their small initial share in the capital stock declines over time and
vanishes in the steady state.
This story is straightforward, but it is at odds with what we know about the
period. The first problem is that economic growth during the Industrial Revolution
was anything but fast. The new industrial technology spread slowly throughout
the economy, and it co-existed for a long time with the pre-industrial technology.
The second problem is that the nobles did not benefit much from the Industrial
Revolution. To the contrary, they found themselves slowly being replaced by the
capitalists as the dominant group. The third problem is that wages remained
constant or even declined throughout most of the period. It took a long time for
the Industrial Revolution to raise the standard of living of the masses.
Let us start our story of the Industrial Revolution again, and let us assume this
time that there is no private credit market due to some unspecified friction. In this
case, the Industrial Revolution transforms the dynamics of accumulation as follows:
(3.7) kt+1 = (1− δ) · kt + β · [λ+ α · (1 + (pi − 1) · st)] · (1− x) · kαt
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Figure 3.2. Consumption of the three different classes with and
without credit market
(3.8) st+1 =
(1− δ) · kt + pi · β · α · (1− x) · kαt
(1− δ) · kt + β · [λ+ α · (1 + (pi − 1) · st)] · (1− x) · kαt
· st
A comparison of Equations (3.4)-(3.5) and (3.7)-(3.8) shows how the absence of
credit and equity markets hampers economic growth. Now it is only the savings
of capitalists, i.e. β · α · st · (1− x) · kαt ; that are invested with the new industrial
technology with efficiency pi. The savings of nobles, i.e. β · [λ+ α · (1− st)] ·
(1− x) ·kαt ; are still invested with the old pre-industrial technology. The Industrial
Revolution starts slowly since capitalists only have a small amount of initial capital.
The ultimate success of the Industrial Revolution depends on whether the share
of capital owned by capitalists grows over time. A brief analysis of Equation (3.8)
shows that this is the case if and only if the industrial technology is productive
enough: pi > 1+ λ
α
. We assume this from now on. From any starting capital stock,
the industrial economy converges to the following steady state:
(3.9) k∗ =
[
pi · β · α · (1− x)
δ
] 1
1−α
and s∗ = 1− λ
α · (pi − 1)
The transition from the pre-industrial steady state in Equation (3.3) to the
industrial steady state in Equation (3.9) is shown in 3.1 and 3.2with solid lines. By
comparing dashed and solid lines we can determine the consequences of not having
a private credit market.
Without a credit market, the Industrial Revolution takes place slowly and leads
to a lower steady state capital stock. Interestingly, it now leads to social change
as the share of capital owned by capitalists slowly grows from negligible to s∗.
Both observations are related since the implementation of the new technology is
only possible as the income share of capitalists grows. Economic growth is slow
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due to a misallocation of investment that declines slowly over time and never quite
disappears. That is, economic growth is slow because it requires social change and
the latter happens only slowly.
The absence of a private credit market hurts the nobles and the masses. Both
groups consume less because capital accumulation slows down. But the nobles are
further hurt because they cannot appropriate the gains from the new technology,
and this reduces their share of this reduced income. The key beneficiaries of the
absence of a private credit market are the capitalists. With a well-functioning
private credit market, they would have been condemned to a marginal role as the
gains from their technology would have been passed on to the nobles. Without a
well-functioning credit market, overall growth is initially slower, but the capitalists
keep these gains and their income share increases.
3.3. The role of sovereign debt. Assume now that the arrival of the capitalists
coincides with a shift from taxes to debt. Although the cost of foreign wars remains
a fraction x of output, the crown no longer needs to finance this cost entirely through
taxes as it can issue debt:
(3.10) dt+1 = Rt · dt + (x− τ) · kαt
where dt are the funds raised by issuing debt in period t−1, Rt is the gross interest
rate paid on this debt and τ is taxes as a share of output. Equation (3.10) simply
says that the crown issues new debt to cover interest payments on existing debt
plus the costs of foreign wars minus taxes.
If the debt issued does not exceed the savings of the nobles, the crown must pay
an interest rate that equals the return to the investment of nobles:
(3.11) Rt = (1− τ) · α · kα−1t + 1− δ
At this interest rate, nobles are willing to purchase the crown’s debt. But capitalists
are not willing to do this since the return to their investments is higher: pi · (1− τ) ·
α · kα−1t + 1− δ > Rt.
For the debt policy described in Equations (3.10) and (3.11) to be feasible, two
assumptions are needed. The first one is that debt dynamics be positive so that
taxes need not be raised to pay for the debt. This requires that pi · β > 1. The
second assumption is that the total amount of debt never exceeds the wealth of
the nobles. This requires that x− τ1− τ <
λ
1 + pi·(1−β)δ·(pi·β−1)
. These two assumptions are
consistent with the evidence presented in section II, and we keep them in what
follows. Thus, we can now write the dynamics of the industrial economy as follows:
(3.12)
kt+1 = (1− δ) · kt + β · {[λ+ α · (1 + (pi − 1) · st)] · (1− τ) · kαt +Rt · dt} − dt+1
(3.13)
st+1 =
(1− δ) · kt + pi · β · α · (1− τ) · kαt
(1− δ) · kt + β · {[λ+ α · (1 + (pi − 1) · st)] · (1− τ) · kαt +Rt · dt} − dt+1
·st
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Figure 3.3. Transition to the industrial steady-state with debt
and taxes
Equation (3.12) shows that, for a given share of the capital stock owned by cap-
italists, debt slows down capital accumulation. The reason is that sovereign debt
crowds out investment by the nobles. In particular, their investment declines by
dt+1 − β · Rt · dt. But Equation (3.13) also shows that debt increases the share
of capital owned by capitalists. From any starting capital stock, the industrial
economy converges to the following steady state:
(3.14) k∗ =
[
pi · β · α · (1− τ)
δ
] 1
1−α
and s∗ = 1−
λ− x−τ1−τ ·
[
1 + pi·(1−β)δ·(pi·β−1)
]
α · (pi − 1)
The transition from the pre-industrial steady state in Equation (3.3) to the
industrial steady state in Equation (3.14) is shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 with solid
lines. By comparing dashed and solid lines we see the effects of sovereign debt.
The shift to debt financing initially slows down growth and eventually increases
it, leading the economy to a steady state with a higher capital stock. To under-
stand this result, note that sovereign debt has two countervailing effects on capital
accumulation. The first one is a crowding-out effect. Sovereign debt reduces the
investments of the nobles and this initially lowers the capital stock. The second
one however is a crowding-in effect. As the capital stock declines, wages and land
rentals fall and the return to the investments of capitalists increase. Both effects
accelerate social change but they have contrasting effects on growth. The crowding-
out effect is static and works on impact, while the crowding-in effect is dynamic and
works over time. Hence, debt accumulation initially slows down growth but then it
accelerates it and raises the capital stock permanently. Crucial for this latter result
is that debt dynamics are positive and the crown does not need to raise surpluses
in order to pay the debt.
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Figure 3.4. Consumption of the three different classes with debt
and taxes
The shift from taxes to debt raises the consumption of all groups. One reason, of
course, is that taxes decline for all groups. Initially, the masses and the nobles find
that this effect is offset by lower wages and land rentals as the capital stock declines,
but eventually both wages and land rentals increase and the capital stock increases.
The consumption of nobles and capitalists is also affected because the return to
their investments increases initially, although it then declines as the capital stock
grows and the economy reaches the steady state. The observation that debt raises
consumption should not be surprising since positive debt dynamics are possible if
and only if the investments of the nobles are dynamically inefficient. It is well-known
that, in this situation, it is possible to increase consumption by lowering these
investments. What is interesting here is that this effect is reinforced because debt
indirectly increases the investments of capitalists which are dynamically efficient.
3.4. A simple numerical exploration. A serious quantitative assessment of the
effects of 18th century British debt accumulation requires reasonably precise esti-
mates of a large number of model parameters. Despite some successful attempts
in recent years (Stokey 2001, Crafts and Harley 2000), we refrain from a full-scale
calibration of our model. However, to demonstrate the magnitude of effects in an
approximate fashion, we perform a crude numerical simulation of the model.
To do this, we use parameter values that allow us to interpret one period in the
model as one year. First, we assign factor shares: we set the land share λ = 0.2
and the capital share α = 0.4. These numbers are consistent with the evidence
presented in section 2, and are broadly in line with factor shares used in growth
accounting exercises (Antras and Voth 2003, Crafts and Harley 1992). Second,
we set the depreciation rate δ = 0.04, which is a standard number in this sort of
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exercises. Third, we set the relative efficiency of investment in the new sectors
pi = 3. This choice for pi implies that the Industrial Revolution raises steady-state
per capita income by a factor of 1.6. Fourth, we use β = 0.9. Having a high value
for β is necessary to create the savings that simultaneously financed the Industrial
Revolution and massive debt accumulation – a key feature of the economic and
financial history of the period (Neal 1993). Finally, we assume the initial share of
the capital stock owned by capitalists is 0.001, that inital debt is zero, and that the
initial capital stock is at the steady state of the pre-industrial society.
We consider three scenarios. In all of them, we set x = 0.132. This corresponds
to the historical average spending for the period 1700-1850. In the first scenario, we
use τ=0.108 which is also the historical average taxes for the same period. Thus,
this scenario assumes an annual government deficit of 2.4% that is financed by
issuing debt. We refer to this scenario as the baseline scenario. We then construct
two scenarios in which we set τ = 0.120 and τ = 0.132, respectively. Thus, in these
counterfactuals the government deficit is reduced to 1.2% and 0% per annum.15
Figure 3.5 depicts the evolution of the debt-income ratio under these scenarios.
In the baseline case, the debt-income ratio grows quickly reaching a peak of 2.28.
This happens 114 periods after the start of the Industrial Revolution. After this,
the debt-income ratio declines steadily and stabilizes around 0.95. In the counter-
factual with a 1.2% deficit, the debt-income ratio follows a similar path although
its absolute value is about half. The peak of 0.94 now occurs 127 periods after the
Industrial Revolution starts. The debt-income ratio steadily declines afterwards;
it stabilizes at 0.48. Of course, in the conterfactual scenario with zero deficit, the
debt-income ratio remains at zero throughout.
Figure 3.6 shows the implications of these scenarios for the share of capital owned
by capitalists. In the baseline scenario, we find that the share of the capital stock
owned by capitalists grows quickly and, 114 periods after the start of the Industrial
Revolution, it reaches a value of 50%. This capitalist ”takeover” is essentially
complete by period 125 when this share surpasses 70%. Rapid social change is
indeed one of the main effects of the massive buildup of debt after 1700. As the
nobles embark on large debt purchases, their investments decline and so do wages.
This raises the profits of capitalists who efficiently reinvested them and quickly
became rich. The importance of sovereign debt in this process can be seen by
looking at the two counterfactual scenarios. In them, we find that 114 periods after
the start of the Industrial Revolution, the share of capital owned by capitalists is
only 18% and 7.5%; and it takes 177 and 278 periods for this share to reach 70%.
Figure 3.7 displays the combined effects of the debt buildup on per capita income
(or wages, since these are a fixed fraction of per capita income). The first one is the
crowding-out effect that happens on impact: the higher the debt, the larger the fall
15We constructed Figures 9 and 10 using the same set of parameters. Thus, the reader can go
back to them to see what the baseline and the 0% deficit scenarios imply for the capital stock and
the consumptions of the different groups.
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Figure 3.5. Debt-to-income ratio under different scenarios
in investment, driven by the fact that the nobility reduces its own low-productivity
investments. The second effect is the crowding-in that happens gradually: the
higher the debt, the faster is social change and the larger the growth of high-
productivity investments by the capitalists eventually. In the baseline scenario,
the dynamic interplay of these two effects implies that the Industrial Revolution is
initially slow as the crowding-out effect dominates; thereafter growth accelerates as
the crowding-in effect becomes large. Thus, income falls by almost 15% during the
first 99 periods only to rebound quickly. Indeed, by period 171 the economy has
already traveled 50% of the distance between the pre- and post-industrial steady
states. And in period 200 it has traveled 75% of this distance.
Once again, the importance of debt accumulation in shaping income dynamics
can be appreciated by comparing the baseline scenario with the two counterfactu-
als. In the counterfactual with a 0% deficit, none of the two effects are present. As
a result, the Industrial Revolution leads to a very slow transition between steady
states. There is no decline in income in the first 99 periods as in the baseline sce-
nario, but it then takes 225 periods to travel half the distance between the pre-
and post-industrial steady states, and 274 periods to travel 75% percent of the dis-
tance. Not surprisingly, the counterfactual scenario with 1.2% deficit shows income
dynamics that are somewhat in between those of the baseline and 0% deficit scenar-
ios. In this case income falls by 6.5% from the start of the Industrial Revolution to
period 99, and it then starts to grow. In this scenario, it takes 196 and 234 periods
to cover 50% and 75% of the distance between steady states, respectively. In other
words, the higher debt accumulation, the greater the initial dip in incomes, and the
faster growth as well as structural and social change become.
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Figure 3.6. Capital share of the capitalists under different scenarios
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3.5. Discussion. The crude numerical simulation in section 3.4 is not designed to
match all the different aspects of Britain’s historical growth experience. However,
it sheds light on a number of important features. There is growing evidence that
wage and output growth were indeed slow, as our model predicts for the initial
phase of debt accumulation (Crafts and Harley 1992, Feinstein 1998). However,
wages and output per capita probably did not fall in absolute terms, at least for
extended periods of time, in contrast to our model’s prediction. Adding an addi-
tional, broader productivity trend for the entire economy to our simulation would
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“fix” this problem; but since we mainly aim at clarifying magnitudes, rather than
maximizing fit, we abstain from such a modification.
Similarly, factor shares probably shifted during the British IR – Allen’s work
(Allen 2009b) strongly suggests that, as population surged, the share of national
income going to labor declined, while profits in the new sectors were sky-high. To
keep our exposition simple, we do not include specifications with shifting factor
shares; we note in passing that the extremely high rates of profit in new industries
are a clear sign of misallocation – namely a failure to redeploy more capital in the
sectors that used it most efficiently, driven by the shortcomings of Britain’s financial
system (Banerjee and Munshi 2004).
Finally, we note some limitations of our argument. Undoubtedly, the first-best
for industrializing Britain would have been a financial system that quickly and
cheaply transferred capital from agriculture to the new industries. Growth would
have been fastest in this case. Given that financial intermediation was stifled by
government intervention, the issuance of debt created a second-best solution – it
allowed for a transfer of resources from “old” to “new” industries through linkages
in factor markets. The same appliesto the case of war. Without expensive wars
and the debt that they required, growth would have been slower – but if an efficient
financial system had allowed for the transfer of resources directly, Britain could have
grown even faster, and without a “need” for numerous expensive military conflicts.
In other words, it was a particular confluence of factors that allowed Britain to pile
up debt at a high rate, creating the largest (sustainable) debt mountain in history,
while industrializing at the same time: Given the limitations of its financial system,
war helped to mitigate the consequences of inefficient capital allocation by crowding
out inefficient investment.
4. Concluding remarks
Under what conditions is debt growth-enhancing? Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
famously argue that major sovereign debt accumulation tends to be associated with
low growth. But not all debt accumulation episodes are similar. What makes this
18th century British episode special is the role of debt as a store of value. In the
absence of a well-developed private credit market, the appearance of a new store of
value displaced low-productivity investments and released resources that were used
to finance high-productivity investments. Are there other situations where such a
mechanism might be at work?
We can think at least of two such scenarios. The financial crisis of 2007-08 and
the long expansion that preceded it have been interpreted by many as the result of
an asset bubble popping-up and bursting. Just like sovereign debt, asset bubbles
are stores of value. In a similar spirit to ours, a number of recent studies have
focused on how asset bubbles can overcome financial frictions and enhance growth
(Caballero and Krishnamurty 2006 , Farhi and Tirole 2014, Martin and Ventura
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2014).16 Since 21st century United States and Europe possess developed financial
markets, this research has emphasized liquidity or collateral, factors that are less
likely to have played the main role in 18th century Britain.
Factors what we highlight for the case of Britain may also have contributed
to China’s spectacular rise in recent decades. Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti
(2011) argue that Chinese growth is driven by the transfer of resources from low-
productivity state firms to high-productivity private firms – severe financial fric-
tions stop private firms from borrowing and force them to finance their investments
through retained earnings. In such a setting, China’s foreign reserve accumulation
may have played a role similar to the buying of government debt by the British
nobility: Reduced investments by state firms might have lowered the demand for
labor and wages, raising the profits of private firms and leading to faster growth
and more rapid structural change.
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